Human beings are very diverse both physically and psychologically. While there are many different kinds of ways to function and experience life that doesn't hurt other people, the culture of the United States, nor psychiatry, hasn't always been conducive to this kind of diversity. Various forms of neurodiversity have been stigmatized in the past, and this includes plurality. Plurality is often portrayed as unmanageable, questionable, and inherently occult by nature, and those ideas contribute to the stigmatization and undermining of those who happen to be plural. This is slowly changing as people realize that plurality caused by trauma is a real condition often requiring help and acceptance instead of fear, and is not always as media portrays it to be. However, few are aware of forms of plurality that arise spontaneously without causing impairments in life, and fewer understand that it's a legitimate form of functioning like any other. There is sufficient evidence for the existence of endogenic plurality, given what we know about the history of the psychological field and plurality.
Historically, plurality has been seen as dissociative in nature, and traumagenic forms were the main focus of researchers. Some well known traumagenic forms of plurality researched today include Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), which was formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder, and Other Specified Dissociative Disorder-1 (OSDD-1). The effects of traumagenic plurality and pathological dissociation often caught the interest of psychologists, leading to many of the theories on dissociation seen today (Lanius, 2015). Endogeneous forms were often missed, and would not be noted until later on.
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) released the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), which listed Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) as a disorder in which two or more identities take recurring control of a patient. This would be the first time any form of plurality was acknowledged by the mental health organization; however it incorrectly pathologized all forms of plurality, as there was no exclusion criteria, and no other diagnostic criteria besides having two or more identities with recurring control (Kluft, 1988). Under this manual, any form of plurality potentially qualified as a disorder regardless of what a patient thought or wanted, and could be considered a target for treatment. The DSM-IV, published in would later rectify this, by specifying that dissociative amnesia be present in addition to multiple identities, and DSM-5 would further add on to this by excluding imaginary play in children, cultural practices, and those who are not distressed by being plural (Natasha, 2017). In both manuals the label of Multiple Personality Disorder was altered and changed to Dissociative Identity Disorder in order to reflect new thinking about how the illness worked.
One of the reasons for the narrowing down of the diagnostic criteria may have had to do with the possibility of endogenic plurality existing, and generating false positives in tests for dissociative disorders. Searching for MPD in the general population brought up a large number of patients, many who presented with minor or reduced dissociation despite having multiple identities (Ross, 1991). They were clearly plural, yet lacked the distress and suffering associated with MPD at the time (Ross, 1991). A possible explanation was that an endogenous form of plurality existed, with up to two percent of the population being naturally plural (Ross, 1991). This would mean that there are potentially millions of endogenics out in the world who live plural lives without major issues.
Ross is not the only one to have inquired into the possibility of non-traumagenic dissociative states, or multiple identities sharing one body. Other researchers have noted the appearance of those who appear to have co-conscious, multiple identity states similar to those in DID, yet lack a traumatic cause or explanation for these experiences (Richards, 1990).
Despite dissociation being viewed as a negative condition by many, there are those that not only live with it, but view their extreme dissociative experiences as positive and fun (Seligman, 2008). Studies into the online plural community have concluded that while many do show multiple identities, it would be inappropriate to consider all as having DID or being traumagenic (Ribáry, 2017). Some have even expressed concerns over the claim that all plurality is inherently pathologically traumatic, discussing the effects it might have on those who do not fit into that category and citing other examples of non-traumagenic forms of co-consciousness, contradicting the necessity of trauma (Walker, 2011).
Nowadays, most psychologists and therapists understand that just because something is abnormal or strange does not mean that it is automatically a disorder or mental illness in need of treating. While some forms of endogenic plurality may look like disorders to the untrained eye, the fact of the matter is that endogenic plurality is not a disorder, nor does it qualify as one. Being endogenic by itself does not cause suffering or significant distress (most endogenic plurals do not want to be cured or treated for their plurality, and tend to lack pathological side-effects of being plural), and endogenic plurality has a very low likelihood of harming others. It has been noted that at least one large community of non-traumagenic plurals experience increased functioning and happiness related to being plural and being "more than one" (Isler, 2017), and it is very likely that this holds true for other non-traumagenic communities, such as the endogenic community.
This is also supported by statistical data on DID, OSDD, and traumagenic plurality. Unlike non-traumagenic plurals, those who are diagnosed with DID and OSDD typically report feelings of depression, anxiety, and fear caused by the condition (T., 2003). There is an increased risk of suicide and self-harm associated with DID and OSDD, and the conditions rarely resolve on their own (Spiegel, 2017). While it would be possible for a few traumagenic systems to initially present asymptomatic and then slowly develop a florid presentation (leading to the initial appearance of endogenesis), it would not explain the large amount of long-term non-traumagenic plurals claiming to experience plurality that does not cause distress or dysfunction. It would fail to explain how varying communities would spring up individually claiming to be some form of non-traumagenic plural, or why they would report similar experiences in the absence of shared data. This indicates a significant difference in terms of pathology between traumagenic and non-traumagenic experiences involving plurality, and reinforces the existence of endogenic plurality.
Without the distress and dysfunction involved in typical cases of DID, many endogenic systems do not qualify for a diagnosis of either DID or OSDD (D, 2016). It is not necessary to treat a system simply for being endogenic or non-traumagenic. If a system can function more or less decently, experiences no distress related to their plurality, and is not harming anyone else or requires any other assistance they do not necessarily need help or treatments aimed at managing or curing their plurality. However, they would still be plural, and still exist as a group of multiple people sharing one brain.
Endogenic plurality is scientifically plausible and is a factual reality for many people. Plurality, particularly endogenic plurality, is just one form of neurodiversity that exists in the world that people experience. It is not an abnormal state of existence, and should not be looked down upon for diverging from "typical" standards and ideas of the mind.
Historically, plurality has been seen as dissociative in nature, and traumagenic forms were the main focus of researchers. Some well known traumagenic forms of plurality researched today include Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), which was formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder, and Other Specified Dissociative Disorder-1 (OSDD-1). The effects of traumagenic plurality and pathological dissociation often caught the interest of psychologists, leading to many of the theories on dissociation seen today (Lanius, 2015). Endogeneous forms were often missed, and would not be noted until later on.
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) released the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), which listed Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) as a disorder in which two or more identities take recurring control of a patient. This would be the first time any form of plurality was acknowledged by the mental health organization; however it incorrectly pathologized all forms of plurality, as there was no exclusion criteria, and no other diagnostic criteria besides having two or more identities with recurring control (Kluft, 1988). Under this manual, any form of plurality potentially qualified as a disorder regardless of what a patient thought or wanted, and could be considered a target for treatment. The DSM-IV, published in would later rectify this, by specifying that dissociative amnesia be present in addition to multiple identities, and DSM-5 would further add on to this by excluding imaginary play in children, cultural practices, and those who are not distressed by being plural (Natasha, 2017). In both manuals the label of Multiple Personality Disorder was altered and changed to Dissociative Identity Disorder in order to reflect new thinking about how the illness worked.
One of the reasons for the narrowing down of the diagnostic criteria may have had to do with the possibility of endogenic plurality existing, and generating false positives in tests for dissociative disorders. Searching for MPD in the general population brought up a large number of patients, many who presented with minor or reduced dissociation despite having multiple identities (Ross, 1991). They were clearly plural, yet lacked the distress and suffering associated with MPD at the time (Ross, 1991). A possible explanation was that an endogenous form of plurality existed, with up to two percent of the population being naturally plural (Ross, 1991). This would mean that there are potentially millions of endogenics out in the world who live plural lives without major issues.
Ross is not the only one to have inquired into the possibility of non-traumagenic dissociative states, or multiple identities sharing one body. Other researchers have noted the appearance of those who appear to have co-conscious, multiple identity states similar to those in DID, yet lack a traumatic cause or explanation for these experiences (Richards, 1990).
Despite dissociation being viewed as a negative condition by many, there are those that not only live with it, but view their extreme dissociative experiences as positive and fun (Seligman, 2008). Studies into the online plural community have concluded that while many do show multiple identities, it would be inappropriate to consider all as having DID or being traumagenic (Ribáry, 2017). Some have even expressed concerns over the claim that all plurality is inherently pathologically traumatic, discussing the effects it might have on those who do not fit into that category and citing other examples of non-traumagenic forms of co-consciousness, contradicting the necessity of trauma (Walker, 2011).
Nowadays, most psychologists and therapists understand that just because something is abnormal or strange does not mean that it is automatically a disorder or mental illness in need of treating. While some forms of endogenic plurality may look like disorders to the untrained eye, the fact of the matter is that endogenic plurality is not a disorder, nor does it qualify as one. Being endogenic by itself does not cause suffering or significant distress (most endogenic plurals do not want to be cured or treated for their plurality, and tend to lack pathological side-effects of being plural), and endogenic plurality has a very low likelihood of harming others. It has been noted that at least one large community of non-traumagenic plurals experience increased functioning and happiness related to being plural and being "more than one" (Isler, 2017), and it is very likely that this holds true for other non-traumagenic communities, such as the endogenic community.
This is also supported by statistical data on DID, OSDD, and traumagenic plurality. Unlike non-traumagenic plurals, those who are diagnosed with DID and OSDD typically report feelings of depression, anxiety, and fear caused by the condition (T., 2003). There is an increased risk of suicide and self-harm associated with DID and OSDD, and the conditions rarely resolve on their own (Spiegel, 2017). While it would be possible for a few traumagenic systems to initially present asymptomatic and then slowly develop a florid presentation (leading to the initial appearance of endogenesis), it would not explain the large amount of long-term non-traumagenic plurals claiming to experience plurality that does not cause distress or dysfunction. It would fail to explain how varying communities would spring up individually claiming to be some form of non-traumagenic plural, or why they would report similar experiences in the absence of shared data. This indicates a significant difference in terms of pathology between traumagenic and non-traumagenic experiences involving plurality, and reinforces the existence of endogenic plurality.
Without the distress and dysfunction involved in typical cases of DID, many endogenic systems do not qualify for a diagnosis of either DID or OSDD (D, 2016). It is not necessary to treat a system simply for being endogenic or non-traumagenic. If a system can function more or less decently, experiences no distress related to their plurality, and is not harming anyone else or requires any other assistance they do not necessarily need help or treatments aimed at managing or curing their plurality. However, they would still be plural, and still exist as a group of multiple people sharing one brain.
Endogenic plurality is scientifically plausible and is a factual reality for many people. Plurality, particularly endogenic plurality, is just one form of neurodiversity that exists in the world that people experience. It is not an abnormal state of existence, and should not be looked down upon for diverging from "typical" standards and ideas of the mind.
Sources:
D. (2016, April 16). Alter Identities in Dissociative Identity Disorder (MPD) and DDNOS. Retrieved October 17, 2018, from http://traumadissociation.com/alters#healthymultiplicity
DSM History. (n.d.). Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/history-of-the-dsm
Isler, J. J. (2017, September 28). Tulpas and Mental Health: A Study of Non-Traumagenic Plural Experiences. Retrieved June 4, 2018, from http://pubs.sciepub.com/rpbs/5/2/1/
Kluft, R. P., M.D., Steinburg, M., M.D., & Spitzer, R. L., M.D. (1988). DSM-III-R Revisions in the Dissociative Disorders. Dissociation, 1(1), 39-46. Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36679937.pdf.
Natasha, T. (2015, May 13). Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) DSM-5 Criteria. Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://www.healthyplace.com/abuse/dissociative-identity-disorder/dissociative-identity-disorder-did-dsm-5-criteria
Ribáry, G., Lajtai, L., Demetrovics, Z., & Maraz, A. (2017). Multiplicity: An Explorative Interview Study on Personal Experiences of People with Multiple Selves. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 938. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00938
Richards, D. G. (1990). Dissociation and Transformation. Journal of Humanistic Psychology,30(3), 54-83. doi:10.1177/0022167890303004
Ross, C. A. (1991). Epidemiology of multiple personality disorder and dissociation. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 14(3), 503-517.
Seligman, R., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2008). Dissociative Experience and Cultural Neuroscience: Narrative, Metaphor and Mechanism. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 32(1), 31–64. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-007-9077-8
Spiegel, D., MD. (2017, July). Dissociative Identity Disorder. Retrieved from https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/mental-health-disorders/dissociative-disorders/dissociative-identity-disorder
T. (2003). Dissociative identity disorder. Retrieved September 13, 2018, from https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/dissociative-identity-disorder
Lanius, R. A. (2015). Trauma-related dissociation and altered states of consciousness: a call for clinical, treatment, and neuroscience research. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 6, 10.3402/ejpt.v6.27905. http://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v6.27905
Walker, W. (2011). Alterity: Learning polyvalent selves, resisting disabling notions of the self. New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 2011(132), 43–52. doi:10.1002/ace.430
D. (2016, April 16). Alter Identities in Dissociative Identity Disorder (MPD) and DDNOS. Retrieved October 17, 2018, from http://traumadissociation.com/alters#healthymultiplicity
DSM History. (n.d.). Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/history-of-the-dsm
Isler, J. J. (2017, September 28). Tulpas and Mental Health: A Study of Non-Traumagenic Plural Experiences. Retrieved June 4, 2018, from http://pubs.sciepub.com/rpbs/5/2/1/
Kluft, R. P., M.D., Steinburg, M., M.D., & Spitzer, R. L., M.D. (1988). DSM-III-R Revisions in the Dissociative Disorders. Dissociation, 1(1), 39-46. Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36679937.pdf.
Natasha, T. (2015, May 13). Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) DSM-5 Criteria. Retrieved September 8, 2018, from https://www.healthyplace.com/abuse/dissociative-identity-disorder/dissociative-identity-disorder-did-dsm-5-criteria
Ribáry, G., Lajtai, L., Demetrovics, Z., & Maraz, A. (2017). Multiplicity: An Explorative Interview Study on Personal Experiences of People with Multiple Selves. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 938. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00938
Richards, D. G. (1990). Dissociation and Transformation. Journal of Humanistic Psychology,30(3), 54-83. doi:10.1177/0022167890303004
Ross, C. A. (1991). Epidemiology of multiple personality disorder and dissociation. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 14(3), 503-517.
Seligman, R., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2008). Dissociative Experience and Cultural Neuroscience: Narrative, Metaphor and Mechanism. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 32(1), 31–64. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-007-9077-8
Spiegel, D., MD. (2017, July). Dissociative Identity Disorder. Retrieved from https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/mental-health-disorders/dissociative-disorders/dissociative-identity-disorder
T. (2003). Dissociative identity disorder. Retrieved September 13, 2018, from https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/dissociative-identity-disorder
Lanius, R. A. (2015). Trauma-related dissociation and altered states of consciousness: a call for clinical, treatment, and neuroscience research. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 6, 10.3402/ejpt.v6.27905. http://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v6.27905
Walker, W. (2011). Alterity: Learning polyvalent selves, resisting disabling notions of the self. New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, 2011(132), 43–52. doi:10.1002/ace.430
